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We examine and discuss the seed accelerator phenomenon which has recently received much attention
both in the US and across the globe. While accelerators appear to be proliferating quickly, little is known
regarding the value of these programs; how to define accelerator programs; the differences between
accelerators, incubators, angel investors and co-working environments; and the importance of the various
aspects of these programs to the ultimate success of their graduates, the local entrepreneurship ecosystems
and the broader U.S. economy. This paper aims to fill this gap.
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Accelerators are a rapidly growing phenomenon. The first accelerator, Y Combinator, was
founded by Paul Graham in 2005 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and soon moved and established
itself in Silicon Valley. In 2007, David Cohen and Brad Feld, two start-up investors, set up
TechStars in Boulder, Colorado, hoping to transform its start-up ecosystem through the
accelerator model. Today, estimates of the number of accelerators range from 300+ to over 2000,
spanning six continents. The number is growing rapidly. The TechStars program and its affiliates
now operate in 11 cities, and the Global Accelerator Network, a selective international umbrella
organization for accelerator programs who follow the TechStars model, counts 50 accelerators in
63 cities on 6 continents among its members.
Initially, many accelerator programs were generalist, accepting entrepreneurs whose
businesses were directed at a variety of different industry verticals. Today, accelerator programs
have also diversified into industry-vertical focused programs, such as Surge (Houston, TX)
which focuses on acceleration of energy start-ups, Kaplan EdTech (New York, NY) which
focuses on education-related start-ups, and Healthbox (Chicago and Boston) and Rock Health
(San Francisco and Cambridge), which focus on acceleration of healthcare-related start-ups.
Others specialize in a myriad of other fashions, for example, restricting applicants to those
affiliated with a given community (women or minority-owned start-ups, or university-affiliated
start-ups) or using or complementary to a particular company’s products (e.g. Microsoft or
Nike).
While proliferation of such innovation accelerators is evident, the efficacy of these
programs is far from clear. Moreover, given the heterogeneity between programs, including the
objectives of the programs themselves, it is likely that outcomes are also heterogeneous. Little
research has explored whether these programs are effective, which ones are more effective and
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what might drive results. Indeed, even descriptive research on these programs is scant.
Furthermore, the definition of accelerator programs remains discordant, which not only
confuses the media and the marketplace but also complicates research, since researchers must
manually categorize programs. For example, some programs with the word accelerator in their
names are actually what we historically termed incubators – co-working spaces with shared
resources and mentorship that is ad-hoc at best. Heterogeneity between actual accelerator
programs further complicates research in this area. It is therefore clear that research needs to go
beyond simple inquiry and explore multiple drivers of multiple outcomes.
Yet, research on the impact of accelerators has been anemic. There are several reasons for
the lack of published research. In addition to the lack of comprehensive data sources mentioned
above, the newness of the phenomena is also an issue. Not enough time has passed since the
inception of many programs to assess outcomes, particularly since accelerators tend to focus on
extremely early stage start-up ventures and most start-ups have graduated from accelerator
programs within the last five years.
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive set of characteristics that define accelerator
programs as distinguished from other programs with similar or related goals. We then proceed to
examine what is known and unknown about such programs from past research, and present
summary statistics on a number of basic accelerator outcomes: (1) What proportion of
accelerator graduates receive follow-on financing rounds? (2) What proportion of graduates have
meaningful exits for founders? (3) How do programs differ in offerings, including mentorship
and education? (4) What questions and data would be fruitful for informing further research and
identification?
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1. Defining the Seed Accelerator
What do accelerators do? Broadly speaking, they help ventures define and build their initial
products, identify promising customer segments, and secure resources, including capital and
employees. More specifically, accelerator programs are limited-duration programs—lasting
roughly three months—that help cohorts of ventures with the new venture process. They usually
provide a small amount of seed capital, plus working space. They also offer a plethora of
networking, educational and mentorship opportunities, with both peer ventures and mentors, who
might be successful entrepreneurs, program graduates, venture capitalists, angel investors, or
even corporate executives. Finally, most programs end with a grand event, usually a “demo day”
where ventures pitch to a large audience of qualified investors (Cohen 2013).
Certainly, much of this sounds familiar. After all, incubators and angel investors, which
are more established phenomena, also help and fund nascent ventures. Accelerators certainly
bear certain similarities to incubators and angel investors. Like the former, accelerators aim to
help nascent ventures during the formation stage. We therefore might expect that many of the
activities provided by incubators and angels would also be provided by accelerators. But
accelerators differ in several ways. Perhaps the most fundamental difference is the limited
duration of accelerator programs compared to the continuous nature of incubators and angel
investments. This one small difference leads to many other differences, as we discuss in more
detail below. We thus define the Seed Accelerator as follows:

A fixed-term, cohort-based program, including mentorship and educational
components, that culminates in a public pitch event or demo-day.

Such programs may be for-profit or non-profit, and may vary in the amount of stipend,

4

the size of the equity stake taken, the length of the mentorship and educational program, the
availability of co-working space and in industry vertical focus. Some are affiliated with venture
capital firms or angel groups, some with corporations, and other with universities or local
governments or non-governmental organizations. The fixed length of the program, its intensity,
the provision of a stipend and services and the cohort-based nature of accelerator programs
distinguishes them from other entities such as incubators, which lack a fixed term, do not
typically provide equity investment in return for cash, primarily focus on co-working space and
shared office resources (internet, etc.), are not selective in admissions, and offer ad-hoc
educational offerings and mentoring if at all.

2. Research on Seed Accelerators
Given the newness of the accelerator phenomena, there is little published research on
accelerators, and virtually no empirical research. Initial reports describe accelerators (Caley and
Kula 2013; Miller and Bound 2011) or compare accelerators to incubators (Isabelle 2013). They
suggest that the primary distinguishing features of accelerators are the limited duration of the
programs, for-profit legal status and cohorts, or classes of start-ups who enter and graduate
together.
Some research highlights the role accelerators play in mediating the relationship between
start-ups and investors. For example, Radojevich-Kelley and Hoffman’s (2012) multiple case
study suggests that mentorship driven accelerator programs connect start-ups with potential
investors, and Kim and Wagman’s (2012) game theory model highlights accelerators’ role as
certifiers of start-up quality. Kim and Wagman (2012), also raise an interesting tension: Since
accelerators are investors in the ventures that they are certifying, they might be incentivized to
withhold negative signals about participating start-ups. Overall, much of the existing research is
5

conceptual, lacking empirics (Isabelle 2013; Kim and Wagman 2012) or relying on a few case
studies (Radojevich-Kelley and Hoffman 2012) 1.
Some exceptions to this include very recent, early-stage empirical studies such as Hallen,
Bingham and Cohen (2013) and Winston-Smith and Hannigan (2013). Both studies assess
whether accelerators accelerate various aspects of startup company development. Hallen,
Bingham and Cohen (2013) compare accelerated ventures that eventually raise venture capital to
non-accelerated ventures that eventually raise venture capital. Their findings suggest that top
programs do in fact accelerate the time horizon for reaching key milestones, including time to
raising of venture capital, exit by acquisition and achievement of customer traction. However,
they also find that many accelerator programs do not accelerate startup development. WinstonSmith and Hannigan (2013), in contrast, compare ventures that have participated in two of the
leading accelerators, TechStars and YCombinator, to similar ventures that do not go through
these programs but instead raise angel funding. Their findings suggest that, relative to startups
that did not go through these programs, startups going through these two elite programs are
founded by entrepreneurs from a relatively elite set of universities, receive their first round of
follow-up financing significantly sooner and are more likely to be either acquired or to fail.

3. Data Availability

One of the primary obstacles to research in this area has been the absence of large scale
representative datasets on accelerator programs that include program features and information
about the companies which enter and graduate from the programs. Accelerator programs are
typically lean organizations, with small staffs and little organized data collection. These

1

Multiple case study of 3 accelerators; not clear how many interviews.
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programs are not tracked by commercial or government data providers. While some of the
accelerators encourage their start-ups to submit some information to public databases like
CrunchBase, not all do so consistently, as many start-ups want to keep funding data confidential
(so as not to attract new entrants or reveal investor interest to potential competitors). Data is
scraped from the internet and collected from other public sources from CrunchBase, and this
publicly available data is aggregated at seed-db.com. However, the publicly available data lacks
crucial detail and may not be complete. Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain whether the
contributed data is representative or even accurate. Few, if any, other data sources provide
information that would speak to the quality and features of these programs.
Some researchers, ourselves included, are therefore focused on assembling proprietary
datasets to address issues of interest. For example, the Seed Accelerator Ranking Project (Gilani,
and Quann (2011), Hochberg and Kamath (2012), Hochberg, Cohen, Fedher and Yee (2013))
collects data from nearly all U.S. accelerator programs with at least 10 graduates that take equity
stakes in their startups, including detailed information on the features of each program,
subsequent financing and exit outcomes from the program’s graduates, and qualitative
assessments of the programs provided by in-depth interviews with a sample of venture capitalists
and angel investors from across the U.S. as well as assessment of the programs by their
graduates. Other collection efforts are focused on qualitative study of the phenomenon. For
example, Cohen’s (Cohen 2013) embedded multiple case study of nine geographically dispersed
and various sized U.S. accelerator programs combines funding data garnered from publically
available databases with semi-structured interviews; archival data, such as blogs, company
websites, and trade publications; and field observations to deduce how ventures accelerators
accelerate the new venture process.
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These datasets provide some initial insight into the features and heterogeneity of seed
accelerator programs and outcomes for their graduates. Some key ranges and statistics are
provided in Table 1. While many graduates of accelerator programs go on to receive seed, angel
and VC financing within a year of completing the program, the variability is high. Furthermore, a
relatively small proportion of accelerator graduates have successfully achieved exit for their
founders; for many programs, no exits have been achieved. This may be due to the newness of
these programs and the substantial period of time required for early stage companies to grow into
viable M&A or IPO candidates.
Table 1.
Summary Statistics for Accelerator Programs from 2012 Seed Accelerator Rankings
Mean

Range

Stipend provided (in $ thousands)

$22.89

$0 – 50

Equity stake taken by accelerator in return for stipend

6%

5-8%

41%

5% - 78%

4%

0%-13%

and mentorship program
Percentage of graduates receiving subsequent
financing of $350K or more within one year of
graduation
Percentage of graduates who successfully exited via
sale or IPO ($1M or more) as of EoY 2011

4. Distinguishing Accelerators from Incubators and Angels

As noted, accelerators are often confused by the media, researchers and policy makers, with
existing institutions such as incubators and angel or seed stage investors. Table 2 below provides
a summary of the differences between incubators, angel investors, and accelerators, which we
discuss in detail in this next section (Cohen, 2013).
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Table 2.
Summary of the Differences between Incubators, Investors, and Accelerators
Accelerators

Incubators

Angel Investors

Duration

3 months

1-5 yrs

Ongoing

Cohorts

Yes

No

No

Business model

Investment; non-profit

Rent; non-profit

Investment

Selection frequency

Competitive, cyclical

Non competitive

Competitive, ongoing

Venture stage

Early

Early, or late

Early

Education offered

Seminars

Ad hoc, hr/legal

None

Venture location

Usually on-site

On-site

Off-site

Mentorship

Intense, by self and others

Minimal, tactical

As needed, by investor

4.1 Accelerators versus Incubators
Even prior to the rise of seed accelerators, groups that provided shared workspace, ad hoc
mentoring and services, known as incubators, had proliferated across the US. Perhaps one of the
best known of these incubators, prominent during the internet bubble of the late 1990’s, was Bill
Gross’ idealabs. According to the National Business Incubation Association, incubators shelter
vulnerable nascent businesses, allowing them to become stronger before becoming independent.
The association’s website 2 reports that 93 percent of all incubators are non-profit organizations
focused on economic development, and roughly a third are affiliated with a university.
In general, tenant firms pay reduced rent to incubators in exchange for office space and
administrative support services (Allen and McCluskey 1990). Incubator managers may also
introduce firms to financiers, and legal, technology transfer, and accounting consultants(Hackett
and Dilts 2004). University-affiliated incubators may also transfer intellectual property from
faculty members to firms that are commercializing the university’s intellectual property.
Philosophically, incubators are designed to nurture nascent ventures by buffering them
from the environment, providing them room to grow in a space sheltered from market forces.
2

http://www.nbia.org/resource_library/faq/#4
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Accelerators, in contrast, are designed to speed up market interactions in order to help nascent
ventures adapt quickly and learn. Practically, accelerators differ from incubators on four
important dimensions.

A. Duration
The limited duration of accelerators, usually three months, is the characteristic that most clearly
defines accelerator programs. Research on incubators suggests that firms graduate from
incubators anywhere from one to five years after they begin (Amezcua, 2011). Established
timelines and strict graduation dates reduce the amount of codependence between ventures and
accelerators and force ventures to face the selection mechanisms that operate in the market.
Participating in an accelerator program may not necessarily keep the venture (or the venture
idea) alive; instead, it may speed up the cycle of the venture—leading to quicker growth or
quicker failure. Quicker failure does have a benefit if those entrepreneurs move on to a highervalue opportunity: they can help grow different ventures and the overall economy. The limited
duration of accelerator programs focuses founders’ attention. Founders work at an often
unsustainable pace for the three-month programs; often working seven days a week, doing little
else but work and sleep. Of course, they could not sustain this pace if the programs were longer
or ongoing.

B. Cohorts
Another byproduct of the structured, limited-duration programs of accelerators is that ventures
enter and exit the programs in groups, known as cohorts or batches. While venture founders in
an incubator may also develop relationships with other founders at the incubator, the experience
of starting in the program at the same time fosters uncommonly strong bonds and communal

10

identity between founders in the same accelerator cohort. The batching selection process also
focuses the accelerator’s marketing and outreach around key dates. Moreover, the open
application process attracts ventures from a wide, even global, pool. Top accelerator programs
accept as few as one percent of applicants.

C. Incentives
Many accelerators are privately owned 3, and take an equity stake in the ventures participating in
the programs 4. Incubators, on the other hand, are mostly publicly owned, managed by managers,
and generally do not have their own investment funds (Allen and McCluskey, 1990; Hackett and
Dilts, 2004). As a result, the incentives of accelerator directors are often more closely aligned
with the ventures than are those of professional incubator managers. Further, some accelerator
owners have extensive experience as entrepreneurs or angel investors, giving them the first-hand
experience they need to assist ventures with a myriad of tasks, from customer development to
fundraising and hiring. Accelerators typically seek growth that leads to a positive exit, while the
best outcome for an incubator might be slower growth, which delays graduation and prolongs the
venture’s tenant status. It is telling that ventures in incubators are called tenants while those
affiliated with accelerators are called portfolio companies--consistent with the fact that most
accelerators take equity stakes in participating firms.

D. Educational Program
Intense mentorship and education are cornerstones of accelerator programs and often a primary
reason that ventures participate. Research on incubators (Hackett and Dilts, 2004) suggests that
3

Recent years have seen the emergence of publically backed accelerators, of which more and more are being
formed.
4
Less frequently, accelerators are non-profit organizations and offer stipends rather than equity investments.
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incubators offer fee-based professional services, such as accountants and lawyers. Education at
accelerators, however, appears to be extensive, and often includes seminars on a wide range of
entrepreneurship topics, including unit economics, search engine optimization, and term sheet
negotiation. Such seminars are usually given by either the directors of the program or by guest
speakers who often provide one-on-one guidance after their talks.

E. Mentorship & Network Development.
Mentorship is also frequently cited as a valuable aspect of accelerator programs, but it varies
quite substantially among programs. Some programs schedule meetings with up to 75 different
mentors during their first month. Others may either make introductions on an as-needed basis, or
simply hand entrepreneurs a list of pre-selected mentors. Meeting with four or five mentors a day
for nearly a month provides a unique opportunity for ventures to build their social network and
learn about alternate strategies. Generally, network development is cited as an important aspect
of accelerator participation. Finally, managing directors provide guidance throughout the
program, helping entrepreneurs understand the knowledge they are garnering through mentor
meetings, seminars, and other means.

4.2 Accelerators versus Angels

Angel investors also aim to help fledging ventures, primarily financially through investment.
Angels are individual investors who provide seed capital investments and varying amounts of
advice to young firms. Often, but not always, they are entrepreneurs who want to help the next
generation of entrepreneurs. They also may be friends or family members who provide financial
investment (Feld and Mendelson 2011). More recently, platforms such as AngelList have been
formed to facilitate matching between entrepreneurs and angel investors.
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While accelerators are often compared to incubators, they are may be more similar to
angel investors. The entrepreneurs who participated in the authors’ research concur. While none
of them considered applying to incubators, nearly all either tried, or planned, to raise seed capital
from angel investors. Moreover, while none of the accelerator founders we spoke to had prior
experience running incubators, nearly all were active angel investors. Angel investors differ
from accelerators in three key ways.

A. Duration
Paradoxically, the limited duration of accelerator programs increases the influence programs
have on portfolio ventures, compared to the influence of other early-stage investors. Because
they make investments in batches, accelerator directors spend more time with ventures. They
dedicate three months to helping a batch of young firms, and then move on to the next batch.
This focused and highly structured time with young startup teams influences the direction of the
portfolio companies while they are still malleable. The limited duration of programs also helps
assemble mentors, guest speakers, and other resources for the ventures. External supporters, like
mentors, can more easily commit to the ventures since the program is short. The limited duration
also forces ventures to graduate at a pre-specified time. Graduations are marked by “demo days”
where venture founders pitch their businesses to large audiences of potential investors. Again,
the structured duration of the program enables the accelerators to periodically assemble
impressive groups of local, regional, and other investors. It is unlikely that individual angel
investors could assemble such impressive groups, or attract the same level of media attention.
Overall, accelerators’ time-compressed programs and social norms encourage frequent dialog
between accelerator directors and participating ventures, and encourage ventures to learn and
adapt.
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B. Business Model and Selection
One of the most difficult aspects of angel and venture capital investing is selecting the most
promising ventures from groups of early-stage companies. The accelerator format helps angels
and venture capital funds select firms by combining the funds of many investors, enabling
accelerators to spread risk across more portfolio firms. Thus accelerators hedge their bets and
increase their odds of picking a home run. Moreover, accelerator fund investors can, and often
do, increase their investments in their favorite firm’s post-accelerator program. Thus, the
accelerator serves as a deal aggregator, and provides a real option for investors who learn about a
batch of ventures before taking a larger financial stake in them.

C. Education, Mentorship, and Colocation
Another challenge for angel investors is being able to influence the strategic direction of
portfolio companies. Angel investors might have a seat on the board and meet with their
portfolio firms periodically to mentor their portfolio firms directly. They typically do not colocate with portfolio companies. In contrast, accelerator directors work alongside their
participating ventures and connect them with mentors, including investors and active or former
entrepreneurs. Moreover, when ventures raise seed funds from multiple investors, it may become
difficult to get all parties to agree to change strategic direction. The accelerator model, however,
provides significant amounts of education, mentoring, and advice throughout the program. It also
encourages and accepts change.

5. Conclusion
Accelerator programs represent a relatively new model of assistance for entrepreneurs
that combines many features that in the past were typically provided separately. They differ
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significantly from previously known models such as incubators, angel investors and co-working
environments. These differences are thought to have significant importance for the ultimate
success of their graduates. While rigorous research in the area so far is limited, the accelerator
model represents an interesting area for further exploration of what affects the success of startup
ventures, and recent data collection efforts may aid in providing an opportunity for deeper
qualitative and quantitative analysis.
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